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INTRODUCTION
Accurate policy evaluation is central to optimal public policymaking. But evaluating the effect of a policy reliably has always been challenging. The most credible evaluation is to estimate and compare the effect of a policy between treatment and control groups in a well-designed experiment, in which the policy is randomly assigned among subjects such that treated and control groups are identical in all aspects except for the policy treatment. Needless to say, this field experiment approach is not feasible in most real-world policy analyses, in which analysts cannot randomly assign treatments and have to work with observational data, policies are often endogenous and open to the influences of subjects, and treated and control groups are not homogeneous or balanced in many dimensions. Yet policy shocks often offer unique opportunities for credible evaluation. In this paper, we craft a quasi-experimental design in the context of Russian regional tax reforms and apply two relatively new methods-the difference-in-differences (DID) estimation and the synthetic controls method (SCM)-to a widely debated policy issue, that is, the impact of corporate tax cuts on foreign direct investment (FDI). Our analysis sheds new light on a longstanding debate of relevance to policymakers, businesses, and scholars in public economics, international business, and political science.
In the past several decades, many governments at national and subnational levels in Europe, America, and Asia sought to attract FDI by setting up investment promotion agencies and offering various fiscal incentives (Li, 2006; OECD, 2003a; UNCTAD, 2000) . While policymakers believed tax incentives helped to attract FDI, multinational enterprise (MNE) managers provided more heterogeneous survey responses, and many did not rank taxes as very important for investment decisions (Tavares-Lehmann, Coelho, & Lehmann, 2012) . Such incongruence in belief and perception between policymakers and managers is puzzling. Further adding confusion to the puzzle, empirical studies from the 1950s to the 1990s produced mixed findings and yet in the past decade and a half, most, though not all, econometric studies appeared to show that lower tax rates encourage more FDI (De Mooij & Ederveen, 2003 , 2008 Devereux, 2007; Hines, 1996 Hines, , 1999 Tavares-Lehmann, Coelho, & Lehmann, 2012) .
In this paper, we offer an innovative empirical analysis of the question of whether corporate tax cuts cause more FDI. We address three weaknesses in previous econometric studies on this topic. First, most empirical studies focus on national-level tax rates, but in many countries, subnational governments also influence tax rates on corporate profit and they often adopt different tax policies. Ignoring subnational discretion and distinctions over corporate tax policy leads to measurement errors and biased estimates. Second, many empirical studies pool together very different countries, the unobservable heterogeneity of which tends to bias the estimated effect of taxation. Third, extant econometric studies focus on estimating the average effect of taxation and pay insufficient attention to the issue of how to identify and compare such effect with the counterfactual, that is, the outcome for the same unit in the absence of a tax cut. To address these three weaknesses, we apply a quasiexperimental design and two quasi-experimental methods to a single country where regional governments were granted autonomy to cut corporate profit tax rates at the same time.
Russian regions during the 1995 to 2008 period provide an ideal setting for such an analysis. In 2002, for the first time, the federal government granted regional authorities the autonomy to reduce their corporate profit tax rates. In response, regional authorities in 82 regions adopted three different corporate profit tax regimes: maintaining the status quo flat rate (no tax cut), tax concession for direct investment profit (nondiscriminatory tax cut), and tax concession for profit from governmentsanctioned important investment projects only (discriminatory tax cut). The exogenously granted policy autonomy allowed the regions to experiment simultaneously with different corporate tax policies. This quasi-experimental scenario presents an opportunity to estimate the effects of tax cuts on FDI across regions within a single country over time.
As noted, we apply two quasi-experimental methods: a parametric identification strategy based on DID estimation and a nonparametric identification strategy based on SCM. DID estimates the average treatment effect for the treated units, and SCM identifies the local treatment effect specific to each region. In our findings, those regions that cut taxes on direct investment profit in a nondiscriminatory manner attract on average significantly more FDI than status quo regions. We also find that, on average, regions that cut tax on investment profit from government-approved important projects do not attract significantly more FDI than status quo regions. Yet for both types of tax cuts, the local treatment effects could vary dramatically from region to region.
Our research makes several contributions. Substantively, our findings provide valuable knowledge on the taxation-FDI relationship. We identify the type of tax cut that is likely to attract FDI. In addition, we find that the effect of a tax cut, even when it works, often varies among different jurisdictions. Finally, we show that fiscal autonomy does not always generate preferred economic outcomes. The success of fiscal decentralization often depends on policy design at the regional level.
Methodologically, we exploit varying regional responses to the same shock within the same country and produce comparisons and inferences based on more homogeneous conditions than those in previous studies. In addition, the two quasiexperimental statistical methods not only allow us to obtain the average treatment effects of tax cuts, but also their local treatment effects specific to regions. The latter information should be of particular interest to policymakers of individual jurisdictions. For researchers, the two methods are easily applicable to other policy issue areas of Tiebout-style sorting and for evaluating policies in federal systems like in our study.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the empirical literature on tax and FDI. The following section discusses why Russian regions provide an ideal quasi-experimental setting and examines some fundamental assumptions underlying our empirical strategy. The next two sections present the parametric DID identification strategy and the associated results, followed by two sections that discuss the nonparametric SCM identification strategy and the associated results. The final section concludes the paper.
BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW ON TAXATION AND FDI
FDI refers to the purchase by a MNE of physical assets or a significant portion of the ownership (stock) of a company in another country to acquire management control. It often involves real investment in plants and equipment or financial flows through mergers and acquisitions, resulting in joint ventures or sole ownerships. Different types of FDI may respond to taxes differently (Auerbach & Hassett, 1993; Blonigen & Piger, 2011; Kessing, Konrad, & Kotsogiannis, 2009) . In this paper we do not study variations among different types of FDI, but focus on the aggregate FDI inflows into each region. The literature on tax and MNE activity is too large to fully review here. We provide a brief overview to set the stage for our application of the two quasi-experimental methods. Many scholars provide extensive reviews of dozens of studies on the topic (see, e.g., De Mooij & Ederveen, 2003 , 2008 Devereux, 2007; Hines, 1996; Tavares-Lehmann, Coelho, & Lehmann, 2012) .
In the international business literature, the most widely applied theoretical framework for explaining FDI is John Dunning's eclectic paradigm of international production. According to Dunning (1988 Dunning ( , 1993 , international direct investments by MNEs are motivated by three sets of advantages they possess relative to host or other foreign firms not engaged in international production: ownership-specific advantages, based on their tangible and intangible assets (e.g., capital, product innovation, management practice, marketing technique, and brand name); internalization advantages, due to their hierarchical control of value-added activities in multiple countries; and location-specific advantages, resulting from the host country's resource endowments, economic conditions, and government policies (e.g., tariff, corporate taxation, investment or tax regulation, profit repatriation or transfer pricing, royalties on extracted natural resources, antitrust regulation, technology transfer requirement, intellectual property protection, or labor market regulation). Taxes could influence all three types of advantages of a foreign firm (De Mooij & Ederveen, 2003 , 2008 . Since taxes reduce the net returns to any firm, all MNEs prefer, though to varying degrees, to pay lower taxes. Theoretically, one should expect lower tax rates to attract more investment inflows. Yet extant empirical evidence tends to be mixed.
Econometric studies typically regress measures of foreign investment on tax variable(s) while controlling for other relevant factors. As shown in a number of surveys of the literature noted earlier, these studies differ in various respects. The dependent variable may be FDI flows, FDI stock, the number of foreign investment locations, or investment in property, plant, and equipment. The tax variables also differ across studies, measured as statutory tax rate, tax base, average tax rate, effective tax rate, effective marginal tax rate, effective average tax rate, or bilateral corporate effective tax rate. The design could be time series, cross-sectional, or panel, and could be at the firm, industry, subnational, country, or bilateral level. Studies from earlier decades produce mixed findings on the impact of corporate tax on FDI, but most recent research (e.g., Becker, Egger, & Merlo, 2012; Bellak, Leibrecht, & Damijan, 2009; Blonigen & Davies, 2004; Devereux & Griffith, 1998; Egger et al., 2009; Grubert & Mutti, 2000 often finds that corporate tax significantly reduces FDI or MNE activities. Yet, conflicting evidence still emerges. For example, using better identification strategies to address tax policy endogeneity, Jensen (2012) finds that corporate tax rates do not affect FDI inflows in 19 industrialized economies from 1980 to 2000.
As noted earlier and by various scholars in the literature, most extant studies tend to focus on national corporate tax rates and pool heterogeneous countries in their samples. Only a small number of studies examine the impact of corporate taxes set by subnational governments on FDI. For example, Bartik (1985) , Slemrod (1990) , Papke (1991) , and Hines (1996) examine how state-level corporate income taxes affect FDI allocation (in terms of investment and plant location) among 50 U.S. states. Swenson (1994) studies how average tax rates affect aggregate FDI inflows in 18 different industries into 50 U.S. states between 1979 and 1991. Becker, Egger, and Merlo (2012) study the effect of business tax rates by German municipalities on location decisions of foreign MNEs.
Beyond the United States and Germany, subnational governments in many other countries also have autonomy levying taxes on corporations. Thus more research is needed to study the impact of different types of tax policies of regional governments on FDI. Focusing on intra-country variations holds constant the unobserved crossnational heterogeneity in terms of endowment, culture, institution, political decisionmaking process, and economic structure that tends to bias the estimated effect of taxation, thus eliminating the confounding effect of unobserved cross-national differences and isolating the effect of interest.
More importantly, extant empirical studies rarely pay attention to designing proper identification strategies before estimation. Many scholars (Abadie, 2005; Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2010; Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Holland, 1986; Rubin, 1974 Rubin, , 1977 show that regardless of the issue area, estimated policy effects based on conventional regression models tend to be unreliable. They argue in favor of various new identification and estimation strategies to get at the effect of public policy. In this study, we take advantage of recent methods that improve the identification strategy with observational data to provide better tests and estimates of the effects of corporate tax cuts on FDI.
EFFECTS OF QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL TAX CUTS ON FDI IN RUSSIAN REGIONS
We analyze whether corporate investment profit tax cuts induce more FDI inflows into Russian regions. The outcome variable is the amount of FDI inflows into a Russian region in a given year, measured in thousands of constant 2000 U.S. dollars and log transformed. Data are from the Federal Statistic Service of Russia (Rosstat).
1 The FDI data reflect a direct-investor ownership of at least 10 percent of the ordinary shares in the equity capital of an enterprise residing in Russia by a direct investor from a foreign country. Direct investment can be in the form of equity capital, reinvested earnings, intracompany loans, and financial leasing, but does not include investment in monetary institutions or banks (for statistical purposes, the latter is included in other foreign investment in Rosstat's data).
2 Figure 1 maps the intensity of FDI inflows into 82 Russian regions in 2002 and 2008, showing that there are significant variations in FDI flows both across regions and over time.
In our design, the treatment variable is the corporate profit tax cut. As in many other countries, Russian profit tax is the tax on the income of legal entities, imposed on net annual profit. We choose to study corporate profit tax because it is one of the main sources of regional budget revenues, accounting for 20 to 70 percent of their nontransferable income. All other types of taxes are either low (hence insignificant for regional tax revenues) or imposed at the federal level (so that regional authorities cannot exercise discretion).
As a result of the Tax Code changes in 2002, corporate profit tax cuts in different Russian regions provide a quasinatural experiment for evaluating the effects of tax cuts on FDI. In Russia, even though corporate profit tax rates always had both a federal and a regional component, setting the rates for both components was traditionally the prerogative of the federal government. However, chapter 25 of the Tax Code, which entered into force in 2002, introduced a new regime for corporate profit tax. The regions were given autonomy to reduce their part of the profit tax rate. With this newly granted power from the federal government, beginning in 2003, regional authorities experimented with three different types of corporate profit tax regimes: maintaining the status quo flat tax rate for corporate profit in general (no tax cut), tax concessions for direct investment profit (hence two separate rates for profit and direct investment profit, applied in an nondiscriminatory manner), and tax concessions for government-sanctioned investment projects only (discriminatory tax cut). No tax cut status quo regions had only one flat tax rate for corporate profit from all sources. Nondiscriminatory tax cut regions adopted separate tax rates for profit and direct investment profit, cutting the latter to encourage direct investment. Discriminatory tax cut regions, like no tax cut regions, implemented one flat rate for corporate profit, but they selectively reduced tax rates for profit from important investment projects only.
In the absence of a truly randomized policy experiment, we consider our study of the observable tax cuts among Russian regions as approximating only a quasinatural experiment. The autonomy to reduce corporate profit tax, exogenously imposed by the federal government, made it possible for regions to experiment with different types of tax policies. Tax cuts, which occurred in some regions but not in others during the 2003 to 2008 period, present a great opportunity to study their effects on FDI. The fact that the policy choices of different regions could be endogenous makes this not a randomized experiment, which is common in policy evaluations. Hence before estimating the treatment effects, we take great efforts to design our study to rule out various confounding possibilities. As we discuss in detail below, we pick regions for control and treatment groups carefully, test whether they are balanced on a large number of covariates, explore whether endogenous tax cuts as theorized in an influential study by Cai and Treisman (2005) are present in our sample or not, and collect and examine qualitative evidence for one small treatment group to rule out possible selection bias.
To correctly identify the effect of tax cuts on FDI, our design has to satisfy the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) (Morgan & Winship, 2007) . It implies the potential outcomes for a unit are affected only by the treatment received by that unit. No interference occurs between units. Spillover and contagion effects violate this assumption. Thus, we design our control and treatment groups carefully to meet SUTVA. The control group includes those regions that implemented no tax cuts and kept the tax rate on profit from direct investment unchanged at 24 percent from 2002 to 2008. This group contains 36 regions.
The first treatment tax regime is applied in 10 nondiscriminatory tax cut regions. An investor in such a region was eligible for the reduced tax rate for net income received from direct investment. Based on the timing of tax cut, we separate the 10 regions into two groups: nondiscriminatory tax cut1 and nondiscriminatory tax cut2. Seven nondiscriminatory tax cut1 regions passed legislation on tax code changes in 2003, as soon as they were able to do so, and implemented them in 2004, reducing their tax rates on direct investment profit to 20 percent (two regions) or 20.5 percent (five regions). Three nondiscriminatory tax cut2 regions passed and implemented similar legislations in subsequent years (2004 and 2005) . Since subsequent tax cuts in those tax cut2 regions were likely influenced by others, thus violating SUTVA, we only estimate the difference between no tax cut and nondiscriminatory tax cut1 regions. In addition, we could not find FDI data for the Kalmykia Republic in the nondiscriminatory tax cut1 group and excluded it from analysis. Appendix Table A1 lists specific regions and their respective tax change legislations.
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The second treatment tax regime is applied in 34 discriminatory tax cut regions. Within these regions, if a firm received approval by the regional authority to be placed on the list of investment projects important for regional development, it would be eligible for the special reduced investment profit tax rate. But there were no common criteria for the importance of investment projects, so each regional government selected them independently. 4 This provided regional bureaucracy with a great deal of discretionary power. Like with the nondiscriminatory tax cut, we separate regions of this tax regime, based on the timing of tax cut, into two groups: discriminatory tax cut1 and discriminatory tax cut2. The discriminatory tax cut1 group consists of 26 regions that cut tax rates for important investment projects as soon as they were able to do so in 2003 (entered into force in 2004). Their rates for selected projects were reduced to somewhere between 20 and 23.5 percent. The discriminatory tax cut2 group includes eight regions that cut tax rates for selected projects in various years during or later than 2004, probably influenced by changes in other regions. To satisfy SUTVA, we only analyze the difference between no tax cut and discriminatory tax cut1 regions, but exclude tax cut2 regions. 3 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher's Web site and use the search engine to locate the article at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgibin/jhome/34787. 4 In this type of tax regime, there is no established common practice among regions regarding the projects getting fiscal benefits. Different regions in this group use even different labels to refer to such projects in their laws, for example, important, special, very important, priority, important for the economic development (of a region), or supported by the (regional) government. For this study, we are less interested in their linguistic differences, but focus on their common attribute, that is, select projects receive preferential tax cuts on investment profit, following the regional legislations that are implemented at the discretion of the regional governments. One may wonder whether nondiscriminatory and discriminatory tax cut treatment regions are geographically clustered, violating SUTVA. Figure 2 maps the geographical locations of the different control and treatment groups listed in Table 1 . It does not show any clear pattern that either nondiscriminatory or discriminatory tax cut regions are geographically clustered, though they do tend to be located in the western part of Russia.
To systematically test the differences between control and treatment regions in various dimensions during the pretreatment period before 2003, Table 2 provides the difference of means tests between treatment (nondiscriminatory tax cut1/discriminatory tax cut1) and control (no tax cut) groups over a large number of covariates, with covariate definitions discussed in detail in the following section. These t-tests apply a generous significance level (20 percent) and show systematic similarities and differences between treatment and control groups. It is useful to note that treatment and control groups are statistically identical with respect to many important covariates such as natural resources, labor cost, population, and gross regional product (GRP) growth. But panel 1 of Table 2 shows significant differences between no tax cut and nondiscriminatory tax cut1 regions with respect to FDI before 2003, GRP per capita, public officials per capita, share of employees with high school education, road density, criminality, urbanization, and control of corruption, and panel 2 shows significant differences between no tax cut and discriminatory tax cut1 regions with respect to trade, investment risk rating, spatial lag, privatization, share of employees with high school education, criminality, urbanization, budget deficit, and total domestic direct investment. These significant differences between treatment and control groups should cause concern if they point to potential endogeneity and systematic biases that determine both tax policies and investments. In an influential theoretical study with some evidence on Russian regions, Cai and Treisman (2005) argue that, given capital mobility and asymmetric initial endowments (e.g., natural resources, human capital, etc.), governments in better endowed regions tend to invest more in infrastructure, adopt more business-friendly policies such as tax cuts, and thus attract more capital. In contrast, governments in more poorly endowed regions often give up on competing for capital. For our analysis, the argument of Cai and Treisman (2005) implies that endowment conditions could drive both tax cuts and FDI flows, with better endowed regions more likely to cut taxes and attract more FDI.
The t-test results in Table 2 do not offer compelling evidence for this type of tax cut endogeneity. On the one hand, two patterns in the t-tests are contrary to the Cai and Treisman (2005) expectation. First, nondiscriminatory tax cuts occur in regions that are inferior to no tax cut regions with respect to FDI flows, GRP per capita, employees with high school education, crime rate, and urbanization during the pretreatment period; discriminatory tax cuts occur in regions that are inferior with respect to investment risk, privatization, employees with high school education, crime rate, urbanization, and budget deficit. Second, tax cut and no tax cut regions are statistically identical with respect to natural resources, labor cost, population, and GRP growth. On the other hand, though, consistent with the Cai and Treisman (2005) expectation, during the pretreatment period, no tax cut regions are inferior to nondiscriminatory tax cut1 regions over road density and control of corruption and to discriminatory tax cut1 regions over trade and total domestic direct investment. In sum, strong evidence is lacking for tax cut endogeneity, but the limited evidence in favor of the Cai and Treisman (2005) arguments suggests the need to control for those systematic differences when we estimate the effects of tax cuts on FDI.
Given the small number of regions in the nondiscriminatory tax cut1 group, Appendix Table A2 further provides qualitative information on those regions to assure that there is no clear selection bias.
5 Overall, this is a very diverse group of regions in terms of economic performance, level of development, economic structure, natural resources, attractiveness to foreign investors, and regional politics. For example, Perm Krai, Rostov Oblast, and the Udmurt Republic were rich regions with 
PARAMETRIC DID ESTIMATION OF AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT
In comparative studies, researchers compare the units exposed to treatment with one or more unexposed units (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2010) . In estimating the effects of tax cuts on FDI using observational data, we do not observe the level of FDI for the same unit in the absence of tax cut, making it difficult to consider the estimated effect to be causal. Ideally, to overcome this problem, we would conduct a field experiment in which tax cuts were randomly assigned among 82 Russian regions. Given random assignment, we could simply compare regions that cut taxes with those that did not. The difference in the average level of FDI between treatment and control groups would constitute the effect of a tax cut. The rationale is that random assignment produces a reliable policy counterfactual because it ensures both groups are comparable with respect to (un)observed confounders. Of course, in reality, tax cuts were never completely randomly assigned. In the absence of completely randomized assignment, we have to rely on quasi-experimental methods to approximate randomization when using observational data (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Holland, 1986; Rubin, 1974 Rubin, , 1977 . This is why, in the previous section, we took great care to create roughly similar control and treatment groups. The DID estimation allows us to approximate randomization by design. Following the regression DID framework discussed in Angrist and Pischke (2008) , hypothetical estimation may take the following form in the context of FDI and tax cuts between one treatment and one control region:
where F DI it denotes observed FDI inflows in region i at period t, ε it denotes independent and identically distributed random error, Treat i indicates a dummy for the treated region that cuts tax at some point relative to the control region, β 2 denotes the time-invariant regional difference between treated and control regions in the absence of a tax cut (fixed effect), Cut t denotes a time dummy that equals 1 after a tax cut kicks in, β 3 denotes the tax cut year-specific effect common to both regions, and (Treat i × Cut t ) denotes the interaction between the treated region and the tax cut year dummy. In this setup, β 4 denotes the DID effect of interest, that is, the average treatment effect of tax cuts on FDI.
The setup in equation (1), when applied to our analysis, requires several modifications. First, even within each group (treatment or control), we have many regions that have unobserved heterogeneity for which we need to account. Hence, we include a fixed effect dummy for each region η i instead of β 2 Treat i .
6 Second, instead of one tax cut year, we have multiple pretax-cut and tax-cut years that each might have a year-specific effect common to all regions (e.g., 2002 experienced a whole countrywide tax cut even though it preceded the regional tax cut years). Hence, we include a year fixed effect dummy for each year, θ t , instead of β 3 Cut t .
7 Third, we have two different types of tax cuts enacted by treated regions in 2003 and implemented in 2004. Hence, we have to estimate the effects of two types of tax cut treatments separately. Specifically, Nondiscriminatory × Cut1 is a dummy that scores 1 for nondiscriminatory tax cut1 regions since 2003 and zero before 2003. Discriminatory × Cut1 is a dummy that scores 1 for discriminatory tax cut1 regions since 2003 and 0 otherwise. Their coefficients represent the DID effects of respective tax cuts on FDI. Finally, we have to control for observed possible confounding covariates, particularly those over which treated and control regions are not balanced in Table 2 . Thus, our DID regression model is specified as follows:
FDI is known to have inertia since all MNEs consider reinvestment in order to stay in the host. We model such temporal dependence by including the lagged dependent variable, F DI i,t−1 , on the right-hand side. Other control variables, represented by X i,t−1 ,include GRP per capita, trade, investment risk, number of public officials per capita, human capital, privatization, urbanization, crime rate, budget deficit, transportation infrastructure, spatial correlation, control of corruption, and total domestic direct investment. All right-hand side variables are those over which treated and control groups are imbalanced. Time-varying covariates are lagged one year to avoid the posttreatment bias. Data for all variables come from Rosstat unless indicated otherwise.
GRP per capita, measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars and log transformed, reflects the level of economic development in a region for a given year. The variable trade, measured as the logged sum of import and export of a region, controls for the effect of trade on FDI, which could be positive (e.g., intrafirm trade) or negative (e.g., tariff jumping investment) (Neary, 2009 ). The number of public officials per capita is a crude proxy for the lack of bureaucratic quality in a region. Inflated bureaucracy is often associated with greater administrative burdens, discouraging foreign investors. The share of employees with high school education in total employment controls for the quality of labor, which may help attract investment (Broadman & Recanatini, 2001 ). We also control for logged road density and percentage of urban population because transport infrastructure and urbanization reduce transportation costs for foreign investors and can facilitate their market expansion (Iwasaki & Suganuma, 2005; Kayam, Hisarciklilar, & Yabrukov, 2007; Ledyaeva, 2007) . In addition, we also control for criminality (number of crimes per 100,000 persons) because social conflict and criminal violence are shown to discourage foreign investors (Broadman & Recanatini, 2001) .
The SUTVA assumption requires no interference between units, but FDI flows tend to be associated with spatial correlation (Bradshaw, 1997 (Bradshaw, , 2002 Ledyaeva, 2007) . We examine the spatial correlation of FDI using Moran's I statistics for three different years (1995, 2002, 2008) . The results indicate the absence of spatial correlation in FDI in 1995, but significant negative correlation among regions during 2002 and 2008. Hence we include in the model a variable spatial lag of FDI. Specifically, we multiply the lagged dependent variable by a connectivity matrix that captures contiguity among the Russian regions in our sample. The connectivity matrix has ones for those regions that share the border and zeros for those regions that do not. Foreign investors often have to consider the impact of investment risks derived from operating in a foreign country. The investment risk rating, compiled by the Russian rating agency Expert, ranges from 1 to 82, with 1 indicating the lowest risk. The variable takes into account political, social, criminal, ecological, financial, and administrative risks investors might face in a region. It is widely used in previous studies (see, e.g., Broadman & Recanatini, 2001 ) and should have a negative sign.
Corruption is a notorious problem for businesses in Russia. Since it might affect both tax policy and FDI, it should be controlled for in our analysis. However, determining the true level of corruption is always problematic. We use several pieces of information to create an indicator for the underlying level of severity of corruption at the regional level. First, we collected data on four different regional indicators, including the following: We rescale all four indicators so that they are bounded between 0 and 1 (with higher values indicating less corruption), and then combine them into one variable control of corruption. Second, as the four indicators are measured at various time points, the combined index has many missing values. Therefore, we impute the missing values using linear interpolation as a function of GRP per capita, which is highly correlated with each component of our indicator of corruption. We double check that values of the final index correspond to the qualitative evidence on corruption in various Russian regions. For instance, the Republic of Dagestan is shown as one of the most corrupt regions in our sample, whereas Tambov Oblast and Novosibirsk Oblast are shown to be the least corrupt. The variable control of corruption is negatively correlated with the severity of corruption and should have a positive sign.
Both regional budget constraints and independence from federal transfers may affect the regions' willingness to implement tax cuts. To capture this possibility, we include logged regional deficit, measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars and computed as [Regional budget revenue − (Budget transfers from federal budget + Regional budget expenses)]. The variable is expected to have a negative sign.
The effect of tax cuts could be spurious if tax cuts are part of an across-the-board liberalization reform. The region fixed effects help to account for any heterogeneity among regions, and the year fixed effects control for system-wide shocks and reforms implemented by the federal government (e.g., trade liberalization). Meanwhile, the studies of other types of reforms implemented in Russia around 2003 allow us to rule out the possibility that other reforms could act as confounding factors. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence of a reform of the labor market regulations between 2002 and 2006 (Denisova, Eller, & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Gimpelson & Kapeliushnikov, 2011) , changes in industrial regulations between 1999 (Vinhas de Souza, 2008b , or of changes in the reduction of informal barriers (Cheloukhine & King, 2007) .
Still, tests in Table 2 suggest systematic differences in terms of privatization and domestic investment between discriminatory tax cut1 and no tax cut regions, but not between nondiscriminatory tax cut1 and no tax cut regions. Since privatization was a salient policy reform in Russia and the volume of domestic investment should also correlate with the outcome of relevant reforms, we control for these two variables in our model. The variable privatization measures the number of companies privatized in a region in a given year. Although privatization reforms were decided by the federal government, we control for it to isolate the effects of other correlated institutional reforms. Domestic direct investment measures total investment of domestic enterprises in fixed assets, measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars and log transformed.
In addition, we also control for economic risk rating and investment climate rating as additional robustness check variables to capture possible effects of broad liberalization reforms in Russia. Economic risk rating ranges from 1 to 82, with 1 indicating the lowest risk. The variable is based on assessments of economic risk related to proposed economic reforms, inflation, retail trade, and consumption at the regional level. The investment climate rating reflects the overall quality of institutional policies, specifically created by regional governments to promote investment (e.g., stability and completeness of the regional investment legislation, equal treatment of both domestic and foreign investors, support for small enterprises investment, etc.). Both variables are created by the Russian rating agency Expert.
Previous studies of FDI also often control for the following variables: population, real economic growth, natural resources potential, political stability, and labor costs. While Table 2 shows that treatment and control groups are balanced over these factors, we control for their effects in a robustness check to ensure the validity of our results. The logged variable population accounts for regional market size, often an important driver in attracting FDI, and it also acts as a proxy for regional labor force (Ahrend, 2000; Ledyaeva, 2007) . The variable real economic growth (GRP Growth) is another traditional measure of regional economic development. Next, FDI often depends on the presence of natural resources, which turned out to be significant in some previous studies (Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Kayam, Hisarciklilar, & Yabrukov, 2007) . We control for regional rating of natural resources potential, compiled by the Russian ratings agency Expert. The governor's tenure in office is a proxy for political stability in a region. Longer governor tenure is associated with more stable and predictable policies, reducing uncertainty for investors. Following Broadman and Recanatini (2001) , we control for labor cost with real growth of nominal wages. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on all variables of interest in the estimation sample and their sources, and Appendix Table A3 shows the correlation among all covariates.
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Since we have both the lagged dependent variable and region fixed effects on the right-hand side, ordinary least squares estimates are biased (Nickell, 1981) . Hence we use the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. It employs the moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equation together with the moment conditions of lagged differences as instruments for the level equation. The generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator helps to identify the effects of time-invariant variables, provides a larger set of moment conditions both to overcome some weak instruments biases of first differenced estimators and to reduce the finite sample bias in panels with short T and persistent regressors. This further enables us to address the endogeneity of multiple variables with appropriate instruments (see, e.g., Arellano & Bover, 1995; Baltagi, 2005; Blundell & Bond, 2000; Roodman, 2009a) . 13 We also estimate robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. Table 4 shows the DID estimation results. For the system GMM estimator to be valid, several assumptions and diagnostic tests are important. First, the error term should be free from serial correlation for the instruments to be valid. With first differencing Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses Coefficients and standard errors of the main explanatory variables are in bold. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 for two-tailed tests in the system GMM, the differenced errors should be serially correlated at order 1, but not at any higher order. Hence, serial correlation tests in first differenced residuals should be significant for AR(1), but not for AR(2). Second, the instruments should be exogenous. The Sargan-Hansen overidentification restriction tests allow one to verify the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid and uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded. Finally, the number of instruments should be smaller than either the number of observations or the number of panels, which helps to prevent overfitting the endogenous variables and artificially reducing standard error estimates (Roodman, 2009b) . Results for all diagnostics in Table 4 are reassuring.
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RESULTS OF DID ESTIMATION
15 Table 4 reports the results for five models. Model 1 follows the literature by including a continuous variable for the corporate profit tax rate and ignoring tax regime differences among regions. It measures the lowest possible corporate profit tax rate for each region, which equals the flat rate for no tax cut regions, the reduced rate on direct investment profit for nondiscriminatory tax cut1 regions, and the reduced rate on select important investment projects for discriminatory tax cut1 regions. As noted, this continuous measure masquerades the fact that different regions implemented distinct tax policies. Its estimated effect has the expected negative sign, but is statistically insignificant. Mixing different tax policies into one seemingly coherent continuous measure of tax rate may have distorted the estimated effect of tax cuts.
Model 2 is our primary model, based on our carefully crafted sample design that compares no tax cut regions with nondiscriminatory tax cut1/discriminatory tax cut1 regions, respectively, and including only the imbalanced covariates. These three groups consist of 69 regions, which drops down to 59 due to missing values of the variables. Model 2 includes the two tax cut dichotomous variables, the lagged dependent variable, and all the covariates on which treatment and control groups are imbalanced as shown in Table 2 . Only a few control variables have statistically significant effects in Models 1 and 2, a pattern in line with previous studies on FDI in Russia (Strasky & Pashinova, 2012) . It also is because we have extensive controls in the models (lagged FDI, region, and year fixed effects). Furthermore, the effects of significant variables are consistent with our expectations. In sum, FDI in Russian regions exhibits strong path dependence and negative spatial correlation, is negatively correlated with regional trade and budget deficit, and flows to areas with lower investment risk and corruption.
In Model 2, the coefficients of both nondiscriminatory tax cut and discriminatory tax cut are positive, but only the former is statistically significant at the conventional level. Thus, Model 2 suggests that tax cuts on direct investment profit increase FDI inflows, but tax cuts on profits from select important investment projects do not.
How large is the average treatment effect of the nondiscriminatory tax cut? If we rely on the estimate in Model 2 (1.59), the size of the treatment effect on FDI between nondiscriminatory tax cut and no tax cut regions is [ e 16 Note that this treatment effect estimate is not directly comparable with the semielasticity (or tax rate elasticity) estimates in the literature, which measures the percentage change in FDI due to a 1 percentage Model 3 in Table 4 reports the results of one robustness test that includes additional covariates. Even though treatment and control groups are balanced over these variables, we estimate the model to check whether our findings are sensitive to their inclusion or not. Results for tax cut variables remain robust as in Model 2, which is reassuring. We should also note that as expected, the additional covariates collectively have very little explanatory power.
One possible issue with Model 2 is that several time-varying covariates could potentially be endogenous, producing posttreatment bias. Even though their inclusion is justified by the lack of balancing between treatment (nondiscriminatory tax cut1/discriminatory tax cut1) and control (no tax cut) groups, they could potentially be affected by tax cut and FDI. The most recent balancing technique, also known as entropy balancing, could help to address this problem. This new method creates weights based on covariates along which treatment and control groups are very different (imbalanced). With these weights, treatment and control groups are made most similar with respect to those imbalanced covariates. One can then estimate a DID model using the simplest specification: controlling for lagged FDI and country and year fixed effects for path dependence and unobservables, but without any other independent variables since balancing has made treatment and control regions identical for those covariates.
Concretely, we implement the following procedures. First, in the pretreatment period we balance the covariates with significantly different means between nondiscriminatory tax cut1 and no tax cut regions using the Stata 12 command ebalance. We do the same for the unbalanced covariates for discriminatory tax cut1 and no tax cut regions.
17 Appendix Table A3 shows that after balancing, the means of all these control variables are exactly the same between treatment and control regions.
18 Second, we use the weights obtained by entropy balancing in the pretreatment period also in the posttreatment period, that is, for the years 2003 to 2008 we use the 2002 weights. As noted, we do so to avoid any posttreatment bias, that is, our treatments might affect some control variables in the posttreatment period. Third, we rerun the GMM estimation with the simplest specification noted above and using the weights from ebalance. Since we have two treatments, that is, nondiscriminatory tax cut1 and discriminatory tax cut1, we have to run two different estimations. This is because the two treatment groups are imbalanced with the control group with respect to different covariates, causing the weights to differ for the two samples. Models 4 and 5 in Table 4 show the results for two comparisons: nondiscriminatory tax cut1 vs. no tax cut and discriminatory tax cut1 vs. no tax cut, respectively. The results are consistent with the findings in Models 2 and 3, with slightly stronger statistical significance, but slightly weaker substantive effect for nondiscriminatory tax cut1.
Therefore, based on the results in Table 4 , we conclude that tax cuts on direct investment profit cause significantly more FDI inflows than no tax cuts, but tax cuts on selective important investment projects do not. Not all tax cuts significantly increase FDI inflows. These findings are robust when we add more control variables and use alternative estimation strategies.
To further diagnose the validity of our findings in Table 4 , we implement three placebo tests. In Table 5 , we first rerun our baseline model replacing the dependent variable FDI with two variables that should be orthogonal to tax cuts: number point change in the tax rate. In a meta-analysis on taxation and FDI, De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) show that of the 371 semielasticity estimates from 25 taxation-FDI studies, their mean semielasticity estimate is −4.7, their maximum-minimum ranges between −84.5 to 17.8. 17 We specify the order of moment constraints (i.e., targets) equal to 2. Results, available upon request, are similar if we use targets equal to one or three. of deaths by alcoholic intoxication in female population and number of female suicides. We expect a tax cut to have no effect on those variables. If it does, it would imply that nondiscriminatory tax cut1 and discriminatory tax cut1 regions differ substantially from no tax cut regions in some aspects we fail to consider, thus invalidating our identification strategy. Therefore, it is reassuring that both nondiscriminatory tax cut1 and discriminatory tax cut1 region treatments are never statistically significant at the conventional level in Table 5 .
In another placebo test, we replace our two treatments in the full model with two dummies that score 1 for nondiscriminatory tax cut1 and discriminatory tax cut1 regions, respectively, in the pretreatment years from 2000 to 2002 and 0 otherwise. The expectation is that if our DID analysis is valid, the leading nondiscriminatory tax cut1 and discriminatory tax cut1 variables should have no effect on FDI. As expected, neither pretreatment dummy, commonly referred to as leads in the DID literature, has any statistically significant effect.
NONPARAMETRIC SCM FOR LOCAL TREATMENT EFFECTS
Even though we separate different regions into various relatively homogeneous tax regime groups to estimate the average treatment effect in parametric analysis, different regions under the same tax policy regime (say, nondiscriminatory tax cut1) could still be rather different. In this case, the average treatment effect does not tell us how effective a tax cut in each individual region is. Hence, for thorough policy evaluation, it is useful to identify the local policy treatment effect specific to each region. This is possible if we could construct the most similar counterfactual to each region for comparison. In addition, DID estimation is "based on the presumption of time-invariant (or group-invariant) omitted variables" (Angrist & Pischke, 2008, p. 243) , as reflected in our region fixed effects. For many cause-effect questions, including ours, the idea that omitted variables are time-invariant may not always be plausible.
To address these issues, we complement the parametric DID estimation using the SCM-a nonparametric estimation technique, which allows us to build a credible counterfactual to identify the local treatment effect (Abadie, 2005; Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003) . The SCM was pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) in a study of terrorism in the Basque Country and further developed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) . The idea behind SCM is simple: a combination of comparison units as a synthetic control often resembles the attributes of the treated unit more closely than any single control unit alone. In other words, the SCM approach allows us to build a credible counterfactual to identify the local treatment effect of tax cut on FDI for a region over a certain period.
How does SCM work for our analysis? We test whether a tax cut adopted by a region i in 2003 and implemented in 2004 leads to more FDI inflow into the region during the 2003 to 2008 period when it is compared with a synthetically constructed control unit that resembles the treated region as closely as possible for the same period. Because comparison units are meant to approximate the counterfactual without the treatment, SCM restricts the donor pool for constructing the counterfactual to those regions with outcomes that are thought to be driven by the same structural process as the treated region, but that are not subject to the same tax cut regimen during the period of study (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2012 ). The comparison regions, which constitute the synthetic controls group, are selected using an algorithm based on their similarity to the treated region, i, before the treatment, both with respect to confounding factors and the past level of FDI. In other words, "the synthetic control algorithm estimates the missing counterfactual as a weighted average of the outcomes of potential controls" (Billmeier & Nannicini, 2013, p. 987) .
Key elements of SCM are the weights of the synthetic control units. Specifically, the synthetic controls algorithm estimates the weights in a nonparametric way so that the distance (or pseudodistance) in terms of the vector of pretreatment covariates between the treated region and the potential synthetic control is minimized.
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Let us take Amur Oblast, a treated nondiscriminatory tax cut1 region, as an example. The synthetic controls algorithm detects the closest regions to Amur Oblast according to a large number of characteristics captured by the control variables among all no-tax-cut regions. We can then compute the difference in terms of the change in FDI from pretreatment to posttreatment periods between Amur Oblast and the synthetic control unit as the local treatment effect specific to Amur Oblast. We repeat this procedure for all treated regions (both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory tax cut1 regions).
More specifically, to build the synthetic controls group, we use all regions in the no-tax-cut group to increase the power of our tests. We approximate all the unbalanced control variables, which we described in the parametric estimation, in the pretreatment period. We also include the lagged dependent variable in the pretreatment period to rule out anticipatory effects. All predictor variables are averaged over the entire pretreatment period (1995 to 2002) . 20 We use the average value of the outcome variable over the pre-and posttreatment periods because FDI flows are known to be volatile, with extremely large values in some years, but very small values in others, and we are interested in the average effect over the years. Averaging FDI flows over the pre-and posttreatment periods helps to remove such idiosyncratic noise, producing more credible local treatment effect estimates.
The SCM approach has several different strengths when compared with parametric estimation (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2010; Billmeier & Nannicini, 2013) . As a main advantage, SCM makes the comparison more directly relevant to each region than in parametric estimation since the control group can be restricted to those regions most similar to the treated unit with respect to most relevant covariates. Therefore, SCM identifies the local treatment effect for each treated region relative to the most similar counterfactual one could potentially construct. It offers an in-depth understanding of the effect of a policy change for each treated unit relative to its most similar counterfactual. Another strength of SCM is its transparency because the comparison regions that end up in the counterfactual, as well as their weights, can be easily identified. Appendix Tables A5 and A6 report the weights assigned to each donor region that contributes to counterfactual constructs for nondiscriminatory tax cut1 and discriminatory tax cut1 regions, respectively.
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Finally, SCM allows the use of both qualitative and quantitative information, formalizes the counterfactual construction, and systematizes comparative case study. 19 Following Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) , and Billmeier and Nannicini (2013), we use a constrained quadratic programming routine that finds the best-fitting W-weights conditional on the regression-based V-matrix. We rely on a fully nested optimization procedure that searches among all (diagonal) positive semidefinite V-matrices and sets of W-weights for the best-fitting convex combination of the control units. 20 Missing values are ignored in the averaging. 21 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher's Web site and use the search engine to locate the article at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgibin/jhome/34787.
Notes:
• The vertical axis of each graph represents the logged FDI inflows into a region.
• Logged FDI is averaged over the pretreatment period (1995 to 2002) One caveat with SCM is that it could still suffer from reverse causation if, say, the timing of tax cuts were decided according to the expectations of future changes in the dependent variable (Billmeier & Nannicini, 2013, p. 987) . Nonetheless, as we argue above, the qualitative evidence suggests that the timing of the tax reform can be considered exogenous to the level of FDI inflows in the Russian regions.
RESULTS OF SCM ESTIMATION
We show results both graphically and numerically, primarily for nondiscriminatory tax cut1 regions, which we aim to compare against the findings of the parametric analysis. Table 6 reports the nonparametric estimate of the local treatment effect for each treated region, which is computed as Figure 3 and Table 6 show that the SCM analysis has built a remarkably similar counterfactual comparison unit for each treated nondiscriminatory tax cut1 region in the pretreatment period, as shown by the fact that their FDI levels are almost identical in each case. In addition, the RMSPE value is extremely small for each region, indicating high goodness of fit.
In the results reported in Figure 3 and Table 6 , four of six nondiscriminatory tax cut1 regions for which we have data experienced noticeably higher local treatment effects. The four regions are Amur Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, the Chuvash Republic, and Rostov Oblast. Two regions failed to attract more FDI after tax cuts. The average and median values of the six local treatment effects are 0.32 and 0.31, respectively. The overall patterns support the idea that tax cuts for direct investment profit help attract more FDI. This is consistent with the average treatment effect estimate from the parametric analysis.
However, the SCM-based local treatment effects vary dramatically among the six regions. They range from 2.81 (Amur Oblast) to 0.28 (Bryansk Oblast) among the four positive effect regions and from −1.08 to −1.16 for Perm Krai and the Udmurt Republic. These varying local treatment effects suggest caution for individual jurisdictions when they seek to use corporate tax cuts to attract foreign investment. It is not possible to learn this lesson if one relies on the average treatment effect estimated from the parametric analysis.
One possible conjecture accounting for the disappointing effects for the Udmurt Republic and Perm Krai is that they appear to be oil-rich. Oil producers work under a special tax regimen called "tax system under production sharing agreement." As a result, investments in the oil refining industry get favorable tax treatment anyway, reducing the effect of a regional economy-wide tax cut.
We have also produced SCM estimates for discriminatory tax cut1 regions, but only report them in Appendix Figure A1 for the sake of space.
22 Their results show some interesting patterns. First, constructed counterfactual units are remarkably similar to treated discriminatory tax cut1 regions, except for Kurgan Oblast. RMPSE values are very low for all regions, except for the Altai Republic and Kurgan Oblast. Second, tax cuts on select investment projects help to increase FDI for 12 of 26 discriminatory tax cut1 regions and prevent FDI from declining more in one region than in its counterfactual comparison unit (Khabarovsk Krai). For the other 13 regions, the comparison units experience higher FDI than the treated units, which indicates the lack of any investment-promoting effect of such tax cuts. The levels of FDI in at least half of the discriminatory tax cut1 regions did not increase as a result of tax cuts implemented after 2002. The finding that more discriminatory tax cut1 regions failed to attract more FDI is consistent with the insignificant average treatment effect for this group as a whole in the parametric analysis. Finally, for these regions, SCM estimates also show great variations in local treatment effects. Not all regions failed to benefit from such tax cuts. Roughly 46 percent of discriminatory tax cut1 regions did appear to attract more FDI.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the important policy debate on whether corporate tax cuts increase FDI. Although there is a sizeable body of empirical literature on taxation and FDI, previous observational studies have paid inadequate attention to the issue of identifying the counterfactual of tax cuts and their effect. In addition, most previous studies, based on national tax rates and cross-national comparisons, ignore the enormous heterogeneity among subnational units in tax policies. To improve upon these studies, we designed a quasi-experimental study of different tax policies by Russian regions when they were simultaneously granted autonomy to reduce corporate tax rates in 2002. Using the parametric DID and nonparametric SCM estimation techniques, we estimated the average and local treatment effects of tax cuts on FDI.
Our research demonstrates how quasi-experimental design and methods that improve the identification strategy of models relying on observational data can be fruitfully applied to policy debates. Such techniques emphasize exploiting natural or quasinatural experiments and creating stringent designs that make treatment and control groups as similar as possible to approximate random assignment, aiming to maximize the validity and credibility of identification and inference. The morale of the story is that before we check and remedy the violations of standard statistical assumptions for classical linear regression models, we first have to make sure that our design and identification enable credible estimates of the treatment effect of a policy.
Despite the lack of random assignment, political dynamics sometimes generate quasinatural experiments. They provide valuable opportunities for scholars to evaluate the effects of different policies. Our research further demonstrates the expanding repertoire of innovative policy evaluation techniques applicable to observational data. The parametric DID estimation helps to identify the average treatment effect across regions, producing knowledge that is valuable for those interested in assessing the generalizability of the effect of a policy. The nonparametric SCM estimation offers a new way to construct a quantifiable, transparent, and verifiable counterfactual comparison and allows analysts to obtain local treatment effects specific to regions, producing information of great value and relevance to policymakers and businesses in individual jurisdictions.
Our identification strategies are applicable to other policy areas. For one, both DID and SCM could be used to estimate the effect of tax cuts on welfare expenditure. Assuming that cutting taxes affects regional budgets, it is plausible to expect a trade-off between increasing foreign investment and lowering expenditure in education and health (Figlio & Blonigen, 2000) . If that is the case, tax cuts would have important implications for income inequality, especially in relatively low-income countries with weak institutions. Beyond fiscal policy, our quasi-experiment methods could be applied to test the impact of decentralization of various policies, such as privatization and labor market regulations.
Our substantive findings shed new light on the taxation-FDI debate. In contrast to previous research, our average treatment and local treatment estimates produce much more nuanced substantive evidence. First, the average treatment effect of nondiscriminatory tax cuts based on the parametric DID analysis is substantial. Second, though their overall trend is consistent with the parametric estimate, the SCM-based local treatment effects vary dramatically in size among nondiscriminatory tax cut regions. Third, selective tax cuts on government-approved important investment projects do not have a statistically significant average treatment effect. Fourth, the SCM analysis, however, shows that close to half of the regions that implemented selective tax cuts in 2003 experienced a rise in FDI. In sum, nondiscriminatory tax cuts on direct investment profit increase FDI, but tax cuts on government-sanctioned important investment projects have only a sporadic weak average treatment effect. Yet for both types of tax cuts, local treatment effects exhibit large variations.
These findings have several important substantive implications. When governments use fiscal incentives to attract foreign capital (Li, 2006; OECD, 2003a; UNC-TAD, 2000) , they should be aware that policy design matters. Consistent tax concession policies that minimize bureaucratic discretion and provide more transparency and stability are more likely to be effective. They are more likely to be worth the investor's while. In contrast, when governments pick and choose winners by cutting taxes selectively on investment projects, such policy practices often introduce more ambiguity, uncertainty, and rent-seeking behaviors. Investors may not respond to those, often idiosyncratic, benefits with systematic enthusiasm and investments. In addition, considering the varying local treatment effects, one should exercise caution against overgeneralization on the utility of any type of tax cuts. Failing to consider these differential effects and regional heterogeneity can lead to misleading policy recommendations.
One popular view in the fiscal decentralization literature is that decentralization empowers subnational units, increases efficiency in the allocation of resources, and leads to more investments and better economic performance (e.g., Malesky, 2008) . Our findings offer a cautionary tale, presenting a conditional view instead. Whether fiscal autonomy leads to more investments depends on the type of policy the subnational government adopts. Our findings are consistent with recent studies such as Gimpelson and Treisman (2002) , and Cai and Treisman (2006) , showing that fiscal decentralization may not always lead to desirable economic outcomes. We believe this lesson should also apply to other economic outcomes. Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, . University, 2010 Allen Building, 4348 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-4348 (e-mail: quanli@tamu.edu) . Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7080, . Yuri Trutnev (2000 Trutnev ( -2004 owned several enterprises and has been openly the richest public official in Russia. Oleg Chirkunov (2004 Chirkunov ( -2012 was also an owner of several enterprises and a business partner of the previous governor Trutnev. Table A5 . List of non-treated regions, included in the synthetic controls estimation for nondiscriminatory tax cut1 regions. Table A6 . List of non-treated regions, included in the synthetic controls estimation for discriminatory tax cut1 regions.
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